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CONSTITUTIONAL
RECOGNITION OF THE
ROLE OF THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL IN CRIMINAL
PROSECUTIONS: KRIEGER
V. LAW SOCIETY OF
ALBERTA
Lori Sterling
Heather Mackay

After the release of Krieger v. Law Society of Alberta,1 commentary on the
case focused on the fact that Crown Attorneys, like all other lawyers, could be
subject to discipline by provincial Law Societies in the event of professional
misconduct.2 While it is true that Krieger clearly established that provinces had
the constitutional power to regulate Crown Attorneys to some extent, what is
most interesting about the case, from a constitutional law perspective, is its
examination of how Crown Attorneys, as agents of the Attorney General, are
unlike any other lawyers. Although hinted at in earlier decisions, 3 in Krieger,
the Supreme Court explicitly recognized, for the first time, that the
independence of the Attorney General in the exercise of prosecutorial
discretion is a principle of Canadian constitutional law.
Prior to Krieger various commentators noted that the office of the Attorney
General has constitutional dimensions. Professor John Ll. Edwards, an
academic expert in the area, wrote that the Attorney General has “a privileged
 Lori Sterling is the Director of the Crown Law Office — Civil, Ontario Ministry of the Attorney General.
 Heather Mackay is Counsel with the Crown Law Office — Civil, Ontario Ministry of the
Attorney General. The views expressed are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the
Ontario Ministry of the Attorney General.
1
2002 S.C.C. 65.
2
See “Crowns Subject to Law Society Discipline,” Law Times, October 21, 2002; “SCC
Sets Rules for Law Societies Disciplining Crowns,” Lawyer’s Weekly, November 8, 2002; Alberta
Crown Attorneys’ Criminal Case Bulletin, Vol. 8, No. 17, October 10, 2002; “SCC Rules on
Jurisdiction of Alberta Law Society and Prosecutorial Discretion,” The Continuing Legal Education
Society of British Columbia; “Law Society Entitled to Review Ethics of Crown Prosecutor,” Great
Library Digests, October 15, 2002; G. Hately, Law Society Oversight of Prosecutorial Behaviour
(2002).
3
See Nelles v. Ontario, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 170; R. v. Stinchcombe, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 326; R. v.
Power, [1994] 1 S.C.R. 601.
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constitutional status”4 and enjoys “immense constitutional powers.”5 Chief
Justice Wells of the Ontario High Court stated “there has existed in the U.K.
and thus in Canada a constitutional discretion in the Attorney General.” 6
Supreme Court Justice Ian Binnie has remarked that the independence of the
Attorney General is a principle of fundamental justice under section 7 of the
Charter.7 And Ian Scott, former Attorney General of Ontario, declared that the
“absolute immunity of the Attorney General on questions of prosecution policy
is accepted as an important constitutional principle.” 8 However, it was not until
Krieger that the Supreme Court expressly entrenched the independence of the
Attorney General within the Canadian Constitution when it observed:
It is a constitutional principle that the Attorneys General of this country must act
independently of partisan concerns when exercising their delegated sovereign authority to initiate, continue or terminate prosecutions.9

This paper will examine the independence of the modern office of the
Attorney General and its agents Crown Attorneys, and how this concept
evolved both as a matter of convention and constitutional law. With emphasis
on the Krieger decision, the meaning and scope of “prosecutorial discretion”
will also be explored. In order to further determine the nature of independence
and prosecutorial discretion, the independence of the Attorney General will be
compared to judicial independence and the independence of statutory tribunals.
Finally, potential implications of the Krieger decision will be canvassed.

I. EVOLUTION OF THE ROLE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
The office of the Attorney General has evolved to include two distinctive
functions: the “political” Attorney General, who, as an elected member of the
legislature and member of Cabinet, is a member of the Executive branch of the
government of the day and thus plays a role in formulating government policy;
and the “chief law officer of the Crown” charged with providing legal advice to
government and directing criminal and civil litigation and ensuring it is con-

4
J. Edwards, The Attorney General, Politics and the Public Interest, (London: 1984), at 360
[hereinafter “Edwards, Politics”].
5
J. Edwards, “The Attorney General and the Charter of Rights,” in Charter Litigation, R.
Sharpe, ed. (Toronto: Butterworths, 1987), at 68 [hereinafter “Edwards, Charter”].
6
Re The Queen v. Conn Stafford Smythe, 70 DTC 6382, Sup. Crt. of Ont., December
10, 1970, at 12.
7
R. v. Regan, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 297, at paras. 157-58.
8
I. Scott, “The Role of the Attorney General and the Charter of Rights,” in Charter Cases
1986-1987, G.A. Beaudoin, ed. (Cowansville: 1987) at 133 [hereinafter “Scott, Charter”].
9
Krieger, supra, note 1, at para. 3.
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ducted in accordance with the public interest. John Ll. Edwards believed these
were opposing roles — that the political responsibilities of the Attorney General might impede his or her ability to carry out the legal responsibilities of the
office independent of partisan concerns. This concern may be largely academic,
however, as it is now widely accepted, and expected, that in his or her role as
chief law officer to the Crown, the Attorney General must put aside the partisan
considerations of the political Attorney General and exercise independence
from Cabinet and the government.
1. History of the Office of the Attorney General
The original federal and provincial legislation, which created the office of
the Attorney General in various Canadian jurisdictions, expressly conferred the
powers and duties that traditionally belonged to the Attorney General of England on the Canadian office-holders.10
As early as the 13th century, the King of England entrusted a barrister, the
“King’s Attorney,” to supervise his legal interests throughout the country. The
role of this Attorney evolved over the centuries and came to include the right to
initiate and terminate prosecutions, (the majority of which were still brought
privately). This right remains one of the most important powers of the modern
Attorney General.11
The English colonies founded in the Maritimes and Upper Canada adopted
the British legal system (with some modifications) and thus each established an
office of the Attorney General. However, from the beginning, the Canadian
Attorney General took a far greater role in prosecutions than in Britain. For
example, Upper Canada established a system of Crown Attorneys in 1857,
more than 20 years before a similar system was developed in England.12
The modern office of the Attorney General continued to take shape as the
result of the union of Upper and Lower Canada in 1840 and an 1846 report on
the administration of justice in the Province of Canada. 13 After the union, the
Attorney General’s main responsibility was to conduct the Crown’s business
before courts and to advise Cabinet colleagues on legal matters. When the
Attorney General or Solicitor General was unable to appear in court they could
instruct counsel, usually Queen’s Counsel, to appear as their representative. 14
10

P. Stenning, Appearing for the Crown (Cowansville: 1986), at 72-75 and 79-87.
Law Reform Commission of Canada, Controlling Criminal Prosecutions: The Attorney
General and the Crown Prosecutor, Working Paper 62, 1990, at 3 [hereinafter “LRC”].
12
M. Bloos, The Public Prosecutions Model from Upper Canada, (1989) 32 C.L.Q. 69, as
cited in LRC, at 3.
13
Stenning, supra, note 10, at 64-68.
14
Id., at 64-68.
11

172

Supreme Court Law Review

(2003), 20 S.C.L.R. (2d)

The office of the Attorney General continued this way until Confederation in
1867. Unlike most modern constitutions within the British Commonwealth, the
British North America Act was “somewhat less than explicit in stating the legal
foundations on which the posers and functions of the Canadian office of the
Attorney General … is said to rest.”15 Nevertheless, the office did receive some
attention in the Constitution Act, 1867. Sections 9 and 11 provide that executive
authority remains vested in the Queen, and that the Queen is advised by an
executive council comprised of people appointed by the Governor General,
although it did not specify who those people should be. However, the first
council did include the Attorney General. 16
The Act was more clear regarding the role of the provincial Attorneys General. Pursuant to sections 34 and 63, the Attorney General is among the list of
executive officers initially included on the executive councils of Ontario and
Quebec. Additionally section 135 provides that the “rights, powers, duties,
functions, responsibilities or authorities” vested or imposed on the Attorney
General prior to Confederation continue, until otherwise provided by the legislature.
Also relevant to the role of the Attorney General were the division of powers
concerning the administration of justice. Section 91(27) gave the federal government exclusive jurisdiction over criminal law and procedure, while section
92(14) gave the provincial governments jurisdiction over the administration of
justice, constitution of the criminal and civil courts, and civil procedure. In
practical terms, this division of powers meant that the federal Attorney General
and his or her agents prosecuted federal statutory offences, with the exception
of offences under the Criminal Code, which were conducted by provincial
Attorneys General and their agents in addition to the prosecution of provincial
“quasi-criminal” offences.17
After Confederation, the federal government and provinces enacted legislation creating and defining the office of the Attorney General (in some provinces
called the Minister of Justice). Although again based on the British model, the
Canadian office of the Attorney General was significantly different than that in
Britain, where the Attorney General was not a member of the Cabinet and had
much more limited responsibilities. Pursuant to An Act Respecting the Department of Justice,18 passed in 1868, the federal Attorney General was given responsibility for prosecutions, providing legal advice to government,
administering the courts, and supervising the police, prisons, and penitentiaries,

15
16
17
18

Edwards, Politics, supra, note 4, at 356.
The first Attorney General of Canada, John. A. MacDonald, was also the Prime Minister.
LRC, supra, note 11, at 6.
S.C. 1868, c. 39.
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in addition to the political responsibilities of the Minister of Justice. In 1966,
responsibility for the RCMP and the prisons was given to the Solicitor General.
With this exception, the responsibilities of the federal Attorney General have
remained the same since 1868.19
Today, the division of responsibilities concerning the criminal justice system
varies to some degree across the provinces but most mirror the federal model.
The exception is Nova Scotia, where the operational and political functions of
the Attorney General were expressly severed by the creation of the office of the
Director of Public Prosecutions (D.P.P.) in 1990.20 The D.P.P., a deputy of the
Attorney General, heads the public prosecution service and is mandated to
ensure that prosecutions in the province are conducted independent of the
Attorney General’s direction and in a non-partisan manner.21 Nevertheless, the
Attorney General maintains “superintendence” over prosecutions. The D.P.P.
and the Attorney General may consult with one another on policy issues or
even in respect to a particular prosecution. However, the D.P.P. is required to
comply with the Attorney General’s instructions or guidelines only if they are
issued in writing and published in the Royal Gazette or the D.P.P.’s Annual
Report — in other words, the Attorney General may only intervene if he or she
19
It is noteworthy that the combined responsibilities of the federal Canadian Attorney General and Solicitor General are divided among five different positions in England: two are members
of the Cabinet, the Home Secretary who is responsible for the police, Crown Prosecution Service
and prisons, and the Lord Chancellor who is responsible for the administration of the courts,
judicial appointments and legal services such as legal aid; two are Law Officers who are government Ministers, but not members of the Cabinet: the Attorney General and Solicitor General; and
the last is the Director of Public Prosecutions, who reports to the Attorney General and is responsible for ensuring the independence of criminal prosecutions.
20
The new delineation of prosecutorial functions in Nova Scotia was the result of recommendations made by the Commissioners of the Inquiry into the Wrongful Conviction of Donald
Marshall, who adopted some of the ideas presented by John Ll. Edwards in his report to the inquiry
entitled “Walking the Tightrope of Justice: an examination of the Office of the Attorney General.”
The change was seen as a way to avoid some of the conduct demonstrated by Crown prosecutors
and police involved in the Marshall prosecution. The creation of the office of the D.P.P. was
preceded by the creation of the Solicitor General’s Ministry in 1987, which was given responsibility for policing and corrections. However, in 1993, the Solicitor General’s Ministry and the Ministry of the Attorney General were merged, bringing responsibility for criminal prosecutions,
policing, corrections, court operations and the D.P.P. under one Ministry. Some critics allege this
undermines the independence of the D.P.P. See Bruce P. Archibald, “The Politics of Prosecutorial
Discretion: Institutional Structures and the Tensions Between Punitive and Restorative Paradigms
of Justice” (1998) 3 Can. Crim. Law Rev. 69, at 76.
21
The D.P.P.’s independence from the Attorney General is said to be secured by the nonpartisan consultation process which occurs prior to the D.P.P.’s appointment, his or her security of
tenure, his or her status as a deputy minister with authority to hire or dismiss members of the public
prosecution service, his or her salary, which is equal to the Chief Judge of the Provincial Court, as
well as the right and duty to prepare an annual report for the Legislative Assembly.
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is willing to “go public” regarding the intervention. 22 Political accountability
for prosecutions remains with the Attorney General who is answerable to the
Legislative Assembly and the public.
While the Nova Scotia system is a novel attempt in Canada to maintain
independence in prosecutorial discretion, it is not without its critics. 23 The
prosecution of the owners and managers of the Westray Mine illustrated a
potential problem with this system. In this case, despite his power to intervene,
the Attorney General of Nova Scotia chose not to. It was therefore the D.P.P.
that bore much of the criticism from the victims’ families instead of the more
politically accountable Attorney General. 24
2. The Attorney General’s Independence from Political
Influence
It has been recognized in Britain since the early 1900s that the Attorney
General cannot take direction from Cabinet in matters of prosecutorial discretion, although he or she may consult or advise Cabinet in such matters. The
appropriate relationship between Cabinet and the Attorney General was articulated in 1951 by Lord Shawcross, while he was Attorney General of England:
I think the true doctrine is that it is the duty of an Attorney General, in deciding
whether or not to authorize the prosecution, to acquaint himself with all the relevant facts, including, for instance, the effect which the prosecution, successful or
unsuccessful as the case may be, would have upon public morale and order, and
with any other consideration affecting public policy. In order so to inform himself,
he may, although I do not think he is obliged to, consult with any of his colleagues
in the government and indeed, as Lord Simon once said, he would in some cases be
a fool if he did not. On the other hand, the assistance of his colleagues is confined
to informing him of particular considerations which might affect his own decision,
and does not consist, in telling him what that decision ought to be. The responsibility for the eventual decision rests with the Attorney General, and he is not to be put,
and is not put, under pressure by his colleagues in the matter. Nor, of course, can
the Attorney General shift his responsibility for making the decision on to the
shoulders of his colleagues. If political considerations which in the broad sense that

22

Archibald, supra, note 20, at 77.
Id., at 77.
24
As noted by Archibald, id., at 98:
The Attorney General must be supportive of the D.P.P.’s policies in general terms and
be prepared to state this support publicly, otherwise the notion of accountability becomes a
sham and the system will eventually fall into disrepute. If the D.P.P. is consistently used as
a political scapegoat, the office will soon suffer irreparably.
23
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I have indicated affect government in the abstract arise it is the Attorney General,
applying his judicial mind, who has to be the sole judge of those considerations.25

As noted by one commentator, it is difficult to find the legal basis for the
right of the Attorney General to act independently as asserted by Lord
Shawcross. Nevertheless, in England it was accepted as a matter of convention.26
The legal source of the independence of the Attorney General in Canada is
equally unclear. In colonial times the Attorney General was a private lawyer
retained by the government, and therefore would not have considered that he
had or was entitled to independence from the government of the day. This
situation continued with the union of Canada East and Canada West as the
Attorneys General and Solicitors General of the new province were required to
hold seats in Parliament and to take part in political affairs. Moreover, government leaders frequently also acted as Attorney General. This combination of
functions continued with Confederation as John A. MacDonald served as both
Prime Minister and Attorney General from 1867 to 1873.
It was not until 1978, over a century after Confederation, that the
“Shawcross” principle — the independence of the Attorney General from political influence — was explicitly recognized in Canada. In a statement to the
House of Commons discussing the principles that guided him in his exercise of
prosecutorial discretion, Ron Basford, then Attorney General of Canada stated:
The first principle, in my view, is that there must be excluded any consideration
based upon narrow partisan views, or based upon the political consequences to me
or to others.
In arriving at a decision on such a sensitive issue as this, the Attorney General is
entitled to seek information and advice from others but in no way is he directed by
his colleagues in the government or by parliament itself. 27

Professor John Ll. Edwards has commented that this was not always the
case: the evidence of previous administrations, irrespective of party affiliations,
suggests that earlier Prime Ministers and Attorneys General did not view independence as necessary to the role of the Attorney General, and decisions in
highly political cases were often made by the Cabinet and carried out by the
Attorney General.
25

J. Edwards, The Law Officers of the Crown (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1964) at 223.
G. Marshall, Constitutional Conventions: The Rules and Forms of Political Accountability
(Oxford: 1984) at 112, as cited in LRC, supra, note 11, at 6.
27
The Attorney General was discussing whether to lay charges under the Official Secrets Act
against a Member of Parliament and The Toronto Sun newspaper, in connection with an article
based on an RCMP report on the Russian intelligence services.
26
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Although the Attorney General is independent from Cabinet or political influence, it should be noted that the Attorney General is accountable to Parliament or the appropriate legislature for his or her decisions — “accountable
politically but also aloof from partisan politics” as it was stated by the former
Attorney General of Ontario, and current Chief Justice of Ontario, Roy
McMurtry.28 It is quite open to the members of Parliament to question the
Attorney General about prosecutorial decisions. However, as noted by the Law
Reform Commission of Canada, this accountability “must be considered in the
context of the reality that party solidarity would lead to the support of the Attorney General, whether independent in decision making or not.”29
3. The Attorney General and Legal Advice to Government
One of the Attorney General’s main duties as chief law officer of the Crown
is to provide legal advice to government. The duty of the Attorney General to
act independently is no less important in this regard. Any advice to government
has to be a “balanced, impartial and accurate analysis of the law,” and independent of partisan political considerations.30 In the rare instances where
private sector lawyers are consulted, the ultimate advice flows through the
Attorney General or his or her agents. 31 Although, ultimately, Cabinet may not
like or choose to follow the Attorney General’s legal advice, the Attorney
General is required to give it independent of partisan considerations.32
The Attorney General must also “bring the focus of justice to questions of
politics” and “bring a particular concern for principle, constitutionalism and
rights to his [or her] policy making function.” 33 That is, when the Attorney
General functions in his or her “political” role and participates in making government policy, he or she must also demonstrate a measure of independence
and object to unprincipled solutions to problems.

28

R. McMurtry, “The Office of the Attorney General” in The Cambridge Lectures, D.
Mendes da Costa, ed. (Butterworths: Toronto, 1981), at 2.
29
LRC, supra, note 11, at 11.
30
M. Frieman, Deputy Attorney General of Ontario, Remarks at the 2001 Constitutional
Cases Conference, April 12, 2002, at 7.
31
The Attorney General does not disclose the contents of legal advice due to solicitor-client
privilege and respect for individual privacy. Nevertheless, prior to legislation being introduced, it is
typically vetted by civil lawyers employed by the Ministry of the Attorney General.
32
Edwards, Charter, supra, note 5, at 9.
33
I. Scott, “Law, Policy, and the Role of the Attorney General: Constancy and Change in the
1980’s” (Spring 1989) 39 U.T.L.J. 109-126, at 119-120 [hereinafter “Scott, Law Policy”].
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4. The Attorney General and Litigation
In his or her role as the superintendent of criminal and civil litigation, the Attorney General must ensure that his or her decisions are not only free from
political influence, but are also based on the rule of law and the public interest.
In the sphere of criminal law, the Attorney General’s independence or “prosecutorial discretion” includes the ability to decide whether or not to prosecute an
individual that has been charged by the police. This decision must be an objective one, based on the circumstances of the case. As expressed by the former
Attorney General of Ontario, Ian Scott:
[I]n determining whether or not to prosecute … the attorney general must be guided
solely by considerations that are independent of his affiliation with a political party
or the government. His decision must be based on his best assessment of what the
law and the public confidence in it require. This necessarily follows from his role
as the chief law officer of the state where that state policy is based on the rule of
law. The confidence of the public administration of justice prohibits the use of the
criminal law for partisan purposes. Moreover, as a guardian of the public interest,
the attorney general must act in accordance with the interests of those whom the
government represents, and not simply in the interest of the government to which
he belongs.34

As a practical matter, prosecutorial discretion is most often exercised by the
Attorney General’s agents, Crown Attorneys. Crown Attorneys not only derive
their prosecutorial discretion from the Attorney General but must also exercise
it in the same independent way.35 The fact that the decision to prosecute must
be made independently, however, does not mean that certain kinds of sociopolitical factors are not brought to bear on the decision-making process. In his
or her role as the protector of the public interest, an Attorney General can consider the social repercussions of the decision to prosecute and the guidelines
they issue to Crown Attorneys. Further, these decisions may be determined
after consultation with Cabinet colleagues. However, the ultimate decision must
be that of the Attorney General alone, and “must be for the public good, and not
for the good of the government of the day.” 36
34

Id., at 112.
LRC, supra, note 11, at 15.
36
Scott, Law Policy, supra, note 33, at 121. The considerations that apply to the decision to
prosecute are similar to those that apply to the actual conduct of a criminal prosecution, where the
role of the Crown prosecutor has been described as that of a “minister of justice.” As stated by
Rand J. in R. v. Boucher, [1955] S.C.R. 16, at 23-24:
It cannot be overemphasized that the purpose of a criminal prosecution is not to obtain
a conviction, it is to lay before the jury what the Crown considers credible evidence relevant
to what is alleged to be a crime. Counsel have a duty to see that all available legal proof of
facts is presented: it should be done firmly and pressed to its legitimate strength but it must
35
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When a provincial government is involved in civil, as opposed to criminal
litigation, an Attorney General may, and often does, take a far more active role.
This role includes issuing instructions to civil Crown Attorneys on positions to
be taken in court or when settlement is appropriate. Typically, civil Crown
counsel act as the Attorney General’s agents in defending lawsuits involving
torts or contracts, or Charter challenges. The Attorney General may also act as
a plaintiff to recover damages. Far less frequently, the Attorney General exercises wider authority to seek an injunction on behalf of the public interest to
enforce public legal rights such as enjoining a public nuisance. 37 This “public
interest standing” can also be used to intervene in litigation that raises important public or Charter issues.38 The Attorney General is also provided with
notice of all judicial reviews and constitutional challenges in the province and
is entitled to intervene in those proceedings.39
The marked difference between the role of the Attorney General in criminal
and civil litigation was explored by Ian Scott. 40 In addition to the existence of a
convention of independence in criminal matters, Scott noted that the distinguishing factor between criminal and civil litigation is one of legislative responsibility. When prosecuting a criminal case, a provincial Crown Attorney is
not prosecuting a law that the provincial government has made or a law for

also be done fairly. The role of the prosecutor excludes any notion of winning or losing; his
function is a matter of public duty that which in civil life there can be none charged with
greater personal responsibility.
37
For example, consider the involvement of the Ontario Attorney General in R. v.
Morgentaler, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30. Although Dr. Morgentaler and his colleagues were acquitted at
trial, the Ontario Court of Appeal overturned that decision, and the accused appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada. While the case was waiting to be heard, the Toronto police again charged
the doctors with the same offence. Although, as Ian Scott notes, they certainly had reasonable and
probable grounds to believe the offence was being committed, there were other things that had to be
considered. The Ontario High Court of Justice had held that it would not proceed with any further
trial of the accused while their appeal was pending before the Supreme Court (Campbell v. Ontario
(Attorney General) (1987), 60 O.R. (2d) 617 (C.A.)). Moreover, given that the facts supporting the
new charges and the defence raised would likely be identical to that of the charges on which they
had been tried and acquitted, it was, in Scott’s opinion, prudent to hold the prosecution in abeyance
until the Supreme Court released its judgment, and thus the charges were stayed. See Scott, Law
Policy, supra, note 33, at 117-18.
38
For example, s. 122 of the Ontario Courts of Justice Act S.O. 1984, c. 11, required that the
Attorney General be notified and given the opportunity to participate in litigation challenging the
constitutionality of an Ontario statute, [as does s. 109 of the Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c.
C.43] see Scott, Charter, supra, note 8, at 137.
39
Judicial Review Procedure Act, R.S.O. 1990 c. J.1, s. 9(4) and Courts of Justice Act,
R.S.O. 1990 c. C.43, s. 109.
40
Scott, Law Policy, supra, note 33, at 116 and 124-25.
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which it has legislative responsibility. 41 However, civil litigation involves
provincial statutes or acts for which the Attorney General has responsibility. In
this case, Scott wrote that it was appropriate for the Attorney General to be
more activist and interventionist, as civil matters were within his or her responsibility and may be a reflection of a particular government policy. Nevertheless,
Scott cautioned that civil litigation must still be approached from a principled
perspective — the Crown’s position must be consistent and uniform, and in
accordance with the law, regardless of policy preferences. 42
Scott’s theory is a partial answer to the question of why an Attorney General
approaches criminal and civil litigation differently. It does not, however, reflect
the reality that while Criminal Code prosecutions are federal matters, they can
vary to a certain degree from province to province as a result of policy choices
by particular provincial governments. For example, the protocol for dealing
with cases involving domestic abuse may be nuanced from province to province; or the prosecution of young offenders may vary from province to province
depending on the comprehensiveness of criminal diversion programs. 43 A provincial Attorney General may also intervene in certain criminal matters by
seeking an injunction in relation to a Criminal Code provision. For example,
where a statutory penalty does not appear to be acting as a deterrent, and there
is a continual flouting of the law, a court may grant the Attorney General an
injunction to aid in the enforcement of the law. This has been attempted on
several occasions in an effort to curb street prostitution. 44 Scott’s explanation
also fails to address regulatory or other “quasi-criminal” prosecutions under
provincial statutes in which the Attorney General will typically not issue instructions despite the fact that the provincial government maintains legislative
responsibility for the statute under which the charges are laid.
Another explanation may rest in the role of the Attorney General. In criminal
matters, the Crown prosecutor’s view of how the administration of justice will

41
For example, in Scott’s opinion, if an Attorney General believes that a Criminal Code
provision under which it prosecutes is unconstitutional, it must defer to the judgment of the federal
government that the law is constitutional and continue the prosecution. In the event of a court
challenge, it is then the federal government that should have the responsibility for defending the
provision.
42
Frieman, supra, note 30, at 7.
43
Sections 8 and 23 of the new Youth Criminal Justice Act, S.C. 2002, c. 1, allow provincial
governments to set up programs which allow authorities to issue cautions to young offenders
instead of instituting judicial proceedings, and to screen charges against young offenders before
they are laid. However, provinces are not required to set up such programs. See Bala, Youth Criminal Justice Law (Irwin Law: 2003).
44
See J. Berryman, The Law of Equitable Remedies (Irwin Law: 2000), at 135-36.
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be served in a particular case must be free from extraneous influences.45 In civil
matters however, the Attorney General and his or her agents typically act as the
government’s “spokesperson,” reflecting the government’s position or policy
objective in a particular matter. Yet a further explanation may lie in the severity
of the consequences for the party opposite the Crown. The principle of prosecutorial discretion is followed in criminal and quasi-criminal matters because of
the possibility of incarceration upon conviction. In contrast, civil matters typically result in damages or discipline. Not one of these explanations for the
unique role of the Attorney General in criminal matters provides a complete
answer but cumulatively, they do provide a compelling rationale for the independence principle.
In R. v. Power, the Supreme Court held that the independence of the Attorney General in prosecutorial decision-making includes independence from
judicial scrutiny. The Court noted that this was a function of the respect for the
rule of law and the separation of powers between the three branches of government — the legislative, the executive, and the judicial. As criminal law is,
and thus prosecutorial decisions are, within the domain of the executive, it is
not normally within the ambit of the courts’ powers to interfere in such matters.46
Nevertheless, courts do maintain a discretion to remedy an abuse of the
court’s process and as such, can review prosecutorial conduct, including discretionary decisions. Power made it clear, however, that courts should be very
reluctant to question prosecutors’ decisions:
[T]he Attorney General is a member of the executive and as such reflects, through
his or her prosecutorial function, the interest of the community to see that justice is
properly done. The Attorney General’s role in this regard is not only to protect the
public, but also to honour and express the community’s sense of justice. Accordingly, courts should be careful before they attempt to “second-guess” the prosecutor’s motives when he or she makes a decision. Where there is conspicuous
evidence of improper motives or of bad faith or of an act so wrong that it violates
the conscience of the community, such that it would genuinely be unfair or indecent to proceed, then and only then, should courts intervene to prevent an abuse of
process which could bring the administration of justice into disrepute. Cases of this
nature will be extremely rare. 47

45

In Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927, at para. 80, the Supreme Court described the role of the Crown in criminal matters as the “singular antagonist,”
compared with the Crown’s role in civil matters where it is more mediation minded.
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[1994] 1 S.C.R. 601, at para. 29.
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Although the number of abuse of process cases before the courts has
increased in recent years, the high threshold set in Power has generally been
upheld. Where it can be shown that the right to a fair trial has been prejudiced,
courts will generally grant a remedy, most often a stay of proceedings.
However, in cases where there is some evidence of an abuse of process that
does not go to the fairness of the trial (the “residual” category of abuse of
process), courts have been far more reluctant to grant a remedy under section
24(1) of the Charter, and particularly a stay of proceedings.48
The scope of prosecutorial discretion, and what constitutes Crown
misconduct, continues to receive considerable judicial attention in the context
of malicious prosecutions actions against Crown Attorneys. In these cases, as
demonstrated in Nelles v. Ontario49 and more recently in Proulx v. Quebec
(Attorney General),50 courts continue to afford prosecutorial decision-making a
high level of deference.51
Prior to Nelles, Crown Attorneys in some provinces were immune from suits
for malicious prosecution. However, Lamer J. (as he then was) found that this
immunity was contrary to public policy as it negated a private right of action
and therefore a remedy for those who were maliciously prosecuted. It was also
Lamer J.’s view that people who were maliciously prosecuted would experience a violation of their section 7 Charter rights, and that absolute immunity
would prevent such a person from seeking a remedy under section 24(1).52
Nonetheless, the Court in Nelles placed “a formidable burden” on plaintiffs
bringing malicious prosecution actions. He or she must prove a prosecutor did
not have reasonable and probable grounds for initiating or continuing the pro48

See D. MacAlister, “Does the Residual Category for Abuse of Process Still Exist?”
(1999), 28 C.R. (5th) 72; N. Gorham, “Regan: The Residual Category of Abuse of Process Continues to Shrink” (2002), 49 C.R. (5th) 87; L. Stuesser, “Abuse of Process: The Need to Reconsider”
(1994), 29 C.R. (4th) 92.
49
[1989] 2 S.C.R. 170.
50
[2001] 3 S.C.R. 9.
51
In 2001, the Ontario Court of Appeal released Oneil v. Toronto (Metropolitan) Police
Force (2001), 195 D.L.R. (4th) 59, which appeared to alter the test set out in Nelles by suggesting
that in certain cases malice could be inferred from an absence of reasonable and probable grounds
to commence or continue a prosecution. If the majority of the Court of Appeal did intend to lower
the standard set in Nelles, they would certainly be at odds with the decisions in Proulx, Dix and
now Krieger, all released after Oneil. Nevertheless, on March 27, 2003 the court released Folland
v. Ontario (2003), 64 O.R. (3d) 89 (Ont. C.A.), which relied both on Oneil and on Milgaard v.
Kujawa (1994), 118 D.L.R. (4th) 653 (Sask. C.A.), among other cases, in holding that Nelles and
Proulx did not settle the law as to whether Crown Attorneys may only be sued for malicious
prosecution, and that actions for abuse of process, conspiracy to injure and intentional infliction of
harm against Crowns may exist at law. This reasoning appears to go beyond the accepted interpretation of Nelles and Proulx.
52
Nelles, supra, note 49, at para. 50.
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ceedings. In order to have reasonable and probable grounds a prosecutor must
have:
[a]n honest belief in the guilt of the accused based upon a full conviction, founded
on reasonable and probable grounds, of the existence of a state of circumstances,
which assuming them to be true, would reasonably lead any ordinarily prudent and
cautious man, placed in the position of the accuser, to the conclusion that the person charged was probably guilty of the crime imputed. 53

If a plaintiff can establish that the prosecutor did not have reasonable and
probable grounds to believe the accused was guilty, he or she must further
prove that the prosecutor initiated or continued the proceedings motivated by
malice, in the form of a deliberate and improper use of the office of the Attorney General or Crown Attorney. As expressed by Lamer J.:
This burden on the plaintiff amounts to a requirement that the Attorney General or
Crown Attorney perpetrated a fraud on the process of criminal justice and in so doing perverted or abused his office and the process of criminal justice. In fact, in
some cases this would seem to amount to criminal conduct.54

Interestingly, although the Supreme Court recognized the historical role of
the Attorney General as legal adviser to the Crown, and the status of a Crown
Attorney as a “minister of justice” in both Nelles and Proulx, it made no mention of any historic legal foundation for these powers which formed the foundation of the test for malicious prosecution.
The Supreme Court’s most recent pronouncement on the scope and meaning
of prosecutorial discretion, Krieger, arose in an entirely unique context —
professional disciplinary proceedings against a Crown Attorney. Krieger not
only explicitly upholds the deferential standard set in Nelles and Power, but
strengthens it by giving it a constitutional foundation.

II. KRIEGER V. LAW SOCIETY OF ALBERTA
1. Facts
Krieger, a Crown Attorney in Alberta, was assigned to prosecute a murder.
Before the preliminary inquiry, he received the results of DNA and biological
tests that implicated someone other than the accused. Ten days later, he advised
the accused’s counsel that the results of the testing would not be available in
time for the preliminary inquiry. After the first day of the inquiry, however,
defence counsel learned that there were in fact preliminary test results that were
53
54
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favourable to his client. He complained to the Deputy Attorney General that
there had been a lack of timely and adequate disclosure.
After a review by the Attorney General, Krieger’s delay in disclosing the test
results was found to be unjustified and he was reprimanded and removed from
the case. The accused complained to the Law Society of Alberta about Krieger’s conduct. Before the Law Society could conduct a review, Krieger sought
an order that the Law Society had no jurisdiction to review the exercise of
prosecutorial discretion by a Crown Attorney and an order that the rule in the
Code of Professional Conduct requiring a prosecutor to make timely disclosure
to the accused or defence counsel was of no force and effect.
The Court of Queen’s Bench dismissed Krieger’s application, holding that it
was within the power of the province of Alberta to regulate lawyers and to
delegate that authority to the Law Society. Also, as the rule at issue dealt only
with matters of prosecutorial discretion where there were allegations of bad
faith or dishonesty, it survived constitutional scrutiny. Justice MacKenzie
rejected the argument that a Crown Attorney could only be disciplined by the
Attorney General. He found that the Attorney General did not have the same
duties to the public as the Law Society, which is charged with protecting the
public from dishonest lawyers.
The Alberta Court of Appeal overturned that decision. Although they found
that the rule in question was intra vires the province, it did not give the Law
Society the power to further investigate this particular complaint, as the investigation would necessarily entail a review of the Attorney General’s decision
that there had been no dishonesty or bad faith in Krieger’s conduct. The rule at
issue gave the Law Society the power to review prosecutorial decisions only in
cases of bad faith. Because the Attorney General had determined there was no
bad faith in this case, the Law Society was outside its jurisdiction in reviewing
the matter.
The Law Society’s appeal was allowed by the Supreme Court of Canada.
2. The Independence of the Attorney General
Before turning to the substantive issues on the appeal, Iacobucci and Major
JJ. reflected on the “unique and important role of the Attorney General and his
agents as distinct from private lawyers.” 55 They noted that the office of the
Attorney General had changed little since its inception in 13th century England,
and that its main function was, and is, the control of public and private prosecutions. In Canada, they observed, the office is one with “constitutional dimensions recognized in the Constitution Act, 1867.” Although the Court recognized
55
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that the duties conventionally exercised by the modern Attorney General are
not enumerated, they found that section 135 of the Act provided for the extension of the authority and duties of the Attorney General that existed prior to
Confederation.56 Moreover, section 63 of the Constitution Act, 1867, also provides that the Attorney General must be included in the cabinets of Ontario and
Quebec.
The Court also acknowledged the advisory and political functions of the
modern office of the Attorney General, and the expansive role Attorneys General play in government and the administration of justice. Nevertheless, the
Court stated that the independence of the Attorney General lies in its power, to
“bring, manage and terminate prosecutions” 57 — a power of such gravity that it
has created an expectation that the Attorney General will carry out this role
“fully independent from the political pressures of government.” 58 The Court
observed that in the U.K. the fear of political pressure has been ad dressed
by ensuring that the Attorney General does not sit as a member of Cabinet. As
such, the dual role of the Canadian Attorney General makes the principle of
independence in the exercise of prosecutorial discretion even more important
than in Britain. It is so crucial in fact, that the Court declared: “it is a constitutional principle in this country that the Attorney General must act independently of partisan concerns when supervising prosecutorial decisions.”59
The Court found support for its view in R. v. Regan,60 released seven months
before Kreiger, and the Law Reform Commission of Canada’s seminal paper
“Controlling Criminal Prosecutions in Canada.”61 Interestingly, although the
Court relied on the dissent of Binnie J., in Regan, they declined to follow his
lead and expressly declared the independence of the Attorney General to be a
principle of fundamental justice under section 7 of the Charter. In Regan,
Binnie J. wrote:
In R. v. G.D.B. … we held that “the right to effective assistance of counsel” in the
criminal justice system reflects a principle of fundamental justice with the meaning
of s. 7 of the Charter. The duty of a Crown Attorney to respect his or her “Minister
of Justice” obligations of objectivity and independence is no less fundamental. It is
an essential protection of the citizen against the sometimes overzealous or misdirected exercise of state power. It is one of the more important checks and balances

56
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Id., at para. 29.
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Id., at para. 30.
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of our criminal justice system and easily satisfies the criteria first established in Re
B.C. Motor Vehicle Act…62

Justices Iacobucci and Major also found the Attorney General’s independence to be rooted in its freedom from judicial interference arising from the
“fundamental principle of the rule of law under our Constitution” 63 as established by the Court in R. v. Power. The independence of the Attorney General
limits the court’s supervision of the Attorney General (Crown Attorney) to his
or her conduct before the court and not his or her exercise of prosecutorial
discretion.
In Krieger, the Court concluded its assessment of the role of the Attorney
General by observing that:
The quasi-judicial function of the Attorney General cannot be subjected to
interference from parties who are not competent to consider the various factors
involved in making a decision to prosecute. To subject such decisions to political
interference, or to judicial supervision, could erode the integrity of our system of
prosecution. Clear constitutional lines are necessary in areas subject to such grave
potential conflict.64

Whether the independence of the Attorney General will be elevated to a
section 7 of the Charter principle of fundamental justice by a majority of the
Court is a matter for future cases. Notably, a section 7 constitutional question
was not stated in Krieger, and therefore the court focused on the constitutional
principles involved in the separation and division of powers.
Although the Court did not expressly frame it this way, Krieger appears to
create a new unwritten constitutional principle which flows from the rule of
law, and the fact that our Constitution is intended to be “similar in principle to
that of United Kingdom:”65 the independence of the Attorney General in prosecutorial decision-making. While the appropriateness of recent judicial decisions
based on unwritten constitutional principles set out in the preamble to the Con62

Regan, supra, note 48, at para. 157.
Krieger, supra, note 55, at para. 32.
64
Id., at para. 32.
65
The preamble to the Constitution Act, 1867 states in part, “Whereas the Provinces of Canada, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick have expressed their Desire to be federally united into One
Dominion under the Crown of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, with a Constitution, similar in Principle to that of the United Kingdom” and the Constitution Act, 1982 states,
“Whereas Canada is founded upon principles that recognize the supremacy of God and the rule of
law.” Both have been cited by the Supreme Court in cases such as Re Manitoba Language Rights,
[1985] 1 S.C.R. 721; Re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217 [hereinafter “Provincial Judges
Reference”] and the Reference re Remuneration of Judges of the Provincial Court of Prince Edward Island, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 3 as one of the sources for the unwritten principles of the Canadian
Constitution.
63
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stitution to create new “rights” can be questioned, particularly in the language
rights sphere,66 constitutional recognition of a longstanding convention such as
the independence of the Attorney General may be less controversial. This is
especially so where the court has already recognized judicial independence to
flow from the same constitutional principles. 67
The acceptance of the Attorney General’s independence as a constitutional
principle is a positive development for the administration of justice — not only
will the standards established by the Court in Nelles, Krieger and Power allow
Attorneys General and Crown Attorneys to make decisions free from external
pressures, they also ensure that those who are genuine victims of a malicious
prosecution or abuse of process continue to have a remedy at law. 68
3. Krieger and the Division of Powers
Arguably, recent Supreme Court cases dealing with the scope of the federal
government’s criminal law power under section 91(27) of the Constitution Act
have expanded what was traditionally viewed as criminal law through the
inclusion of matters such as environmental regulation and tobacco advertising
within the ambit of criminal law. 69 This does not mean, however, that the provincial power to regulate local matters has been decreasing. While the Court, as
it stated in the Reference re Firearms Act (Can.),70 will not hesitate to strike
down legislation that is not validly criminal law, increasingly, the focus of
division of powers analysis is the question of “express conflict” between overlapping provincial and federal spheres of legislative responsibility. That is, only
where federal and provincial laws expressly conflict, in that compliance with
one would involve the breach of the other, will the court find an inconsistency,

66
In Lalonde v. Ontario (2001), 56 O.R. (3d) 505 [Monfort Hospital], the Ontario Court of
Appeal relied, in part, on the “constitution’s structural principle of respect for and protection of
minorities” as authority for the proposition that the Province’s Hospital Restructuring Commission
could not close the Province’s only French language teaching hospital.
67
Provincial Judge’s Reference, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217.
68
It is probable that Kent Roach would take the opposite view. In his article, “The Attorney
General and the Charter Revisited” (2000) 50 U.T.L.J. 1, Roach expresses the view that the
constitutionalization of abuse of process and malicious prosecution, combined with the failure of
courts to recognize “constitutional torts” such as negligent prosecution, and the large scale failure
of ss. 7 and 15 Charter challenges to specific aspects of prosecutorial discretion, has left victims of
prosecutorial misconduct with little recourse. He also argues that because misconduct must be
found to be “unconstitutional” before courts will intervene, intervention will be rare. As a result, in
his view, the Charter has actually hindered opportunities to check prosecutorial misconduct.
69
R. v. Hydro-Québec, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 213 and RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney
General), [1995] 3 S.C.R. 199.
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[2000] 1 S.C.R. 783.
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and trigger the doctrine of paramountcy. 71 The division of powers analysis in
Krieger follows this formula insofar as it seeks to recognize the “co-existence”
of both federal and provincial roles in the area of criminal law and the administration of justice as they relate to the regulation of lawyers.
Krieger challenged the Law Society’s jurisdiction to discipline him by alleging that Rule 28(d) of the Law Society of Alberta’s Code of Professional Conduct was an “unconstitutional regulation by the province of criminal law and
procedure”72 and thus encroached on the federal government’s power in section
91(27). The Supreme Court found, however, that the impugned rule involved
both federal and provincial matters. While provincial regulations establishing
guidelines for the conduct of a lawyer in a criminal trial might have some impact on criminal procedure, in “pith and substance” such regulations were
within the provincial sphere. The provincial heads of authority to legislate
regarding matters involving “property and civil rights” (section 92(13)) and
“the administration of justice” (section 92(14)) included the power to licence
and regulate lawyers, and review their alleged breaches of ethics.73
In determining that the impugned rule was a matter of professional discipline
and not criminal law or procedure, the Court noted that the rule was situated in
the Alberta Code of Professional Conduct, the purpose of which was to govern
the ethical conduct of lawyers; that Benchers were authorized to establish an
ethics code for members by the Legal Profession Act; that the commentary of
the rule specifically noted that its application was limited to circumstances
where a prosecutor acted dishonestly or in bad faith and that it was not intended
to interfere with prosecutorial discretion; 74 and the examples in the commentary
demonstrate that the rule is not intended to interfere with the disclosure obligations set out in the Supreme Court’s ruling in R. v. Stinchcombe.75
The Court also found that the Law Society had the general power to regulate
all lawyers in the province — including Crown Attorneys. Justices Iacobucci
and Major disagreed with the Alberta Court of Appeal’s conclusion that the
Law Society could not review Krieger’s conduct because the Attorney General
71
See P. Monahan, Constitutional Law, 2nd ed., (Irwin Law: 2002), at 127. Multiple Access
v. McCuthcheon, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 161; Bank of Montreal v. Hall, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 121, and British
Columbia Law Society v. Mangat, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 113.
72
Krieger, supra, note 55, at para. 34.
73
Interestingly, although the court acknowledged the “legislative competence of the province to regulate the Law Society has been grounded in both ss. 92(13) [“property and civil rights”]
and 92(14) [“administration of justice”]” it found “the weight of authority” was in the property and
civil rights jurisdiction, rather than that of the administration of justice, at para. 33.
74
Whether the Court would make the same finding for a similar rule that did not specifically
limit its application (i.e., the rule of the Law Society of Upper Canada) remains an issue for a future
case.
75
[1991] 3 S.C.R. 326.
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had already investigated the matter and found that Krieger did not act in bad
faith. It was their view that a review by the Attorney General and a review by
the Law Society were two very different inquiries. In effect, the Court found
that a Crown Attorney had two masters — he or she was required to meet the
departmental standards set by his or her employer, the Attorney General, and he
or she was also required to be a member of the Law Society, and thus was
required to follow its ethical guidelines:
The Attorney General is responsible for determining the policies of Crown prosecutors. The Law Society is responsible for enforcing the ethical standards required of
lawyers. Certain aspects of a Crown prosecutor’s conduct may trigger a review by
the Attorney General and other aspects, usually ethical conduct considerations, may
mean a review by the Law Society. A prosecutor whose conduct so contravenes
professional ethical standards that the public would be best served by preventing
him or her from practicing law in any capacity in the province should not be immune from disbarment. Only the Law Society can protect the public in this way.76

Consequently, the Supreme Court permitted the Law Society to review
Krieger’s conduct to determine whether he had acted beyond the scope of his
prosecutorial duties by exercising his discretion dishonestly or in bad faith.77 If
dishonesty or bad faith in the exercise of prosecutorial discretion is uncovered,
the Law Society may proceed with disciplinary proceedings. However, if there
is no evidence that the Crown Attorney’s prosecutorial discretion was exercised
improperly, the Law Society may not proceed any further with its review.
When considering the content and parameters of prosecutorial discretion,
Iacobucci and Major JJ. were quick to point out that the term does not encompass every decision made by a Crown prosecutor. It refers specifically to “those
powers that constitute the core of the Attorney General’s office and which are
protected from the influence of improper political and other vitiating factors by
the principle of independence,”78 including the “discretion exercised by the
Attorney-General in matters within his authority in relation to the prosecution
of criminal offences.”79
Prosecutorial discretion, the Court concluded, includes decisions that deal
with the nature and extent of a prosecution such as: the discretion whether to
76

Krieger, 2002 SCC 65, at para. 58.
Krieger v. The Law Society of Alberta (2000), 27 A.R. 31, at paras. 41-43. Rule 28(d) of
the Law Society of Alberta’s Code of Professional Conduct cited the following as examples of bad
faith or dishonesty: “an exercise of discretion intended to obstruct, pervert or defeat the course of
justice; an exercise of discretion undertaken for the personal advantage of the prosecutor; [or] an
exercise of discretion intended to deprive an individual of equality before the law by reason of
discrimination …”
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bring the prosecution of a charge laid by the police; the discretion to enter a
stay of proceedings in either a private or public prosecution; the discretion to
accept a guilty plea to a lesser charge; the discretion to withdraw from criminal
proceedings altogether; and the discretion to take control of a private prosecution. Decisions that involve the actual conduct of the case before the court, such
as pre-trial disclosure or the methods employed in cross-examination, do not
fall within “prosecutorial discretion,” and are governed by the inherent jurisdiction of the court to control its own processes (i.e., abuse of process).80
The Court also observed that while such decisions are not entirely immune
from review, they are entitled to deference:
In our theory of government, it is the sovereign who holds the power to prosecute
his or her subjects. A decision of the Attorney General, or of his or her agents,
within the authority delegated to him or her by the sovereign is not subject to interference by other arms of government. An exercise of prosecutorial discretion will,
therefore, be treated with deference by the courts and by other members of the executive, as well as statutory bodies like provincial law societies.81

It was recognized that discretionary decisions are essential to the efficiency
of the criminal justice system but because courts will afford them a great deal
of deference, they must be exercised with “objectivity and dispassion.” 82 Courts
are entitled to review decisions of the Attorney General or his or her agents in
cases of “flagrant impropriety” or where malice in the course of a prosecution
is shown, because in these situations, a prosecutor is acting “beyond the scope
of his office as protected by the constitutional principle and the justification for
such deference will have evaporated.”83
Similar principles applied to review by provincial law societies, only insofar as
it is shown that a prosecutor has exercised his or her prosecutorial discretion in
bad faith, or for improper purpose, because actions carried out in such a way
mean the Attorney General or Crown Attorney are acting beyond his or her
scope of authority.
The Court illustrated its analysis through the example of the legal obligation of
a Crown prosecutor to disclose all relevant information to the defence in a criminal trial. While the Crown retains the discretion not to disclose irrelevant information, there is no discretion regarding the disclosure of relevant information
save for privilege and timing issues. If there was an alleged breach of the duty to
disclose, a law society must be permitted to review the matter to determine prima
facie whether it was done in bad faith or for improper purpose and thus outside of
80
81
82
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the powers of the prosecutor. It is only in those instances that a Law Society, like a
court, would be allowed to interfere.84

III. THE INDEPENDENCE “SPECTRUM”
When compared with other types of independence with constitutional or
quasi-constitutional dimensions, the independence of the Attorney General
appears to fall between judicial independence and tribunal independence.
It is clear that the Attorney General and his or her agents do not enjoy the
hallmarks of independence enjoyed by the judiciary such as security of tenure,
financial security or institutional independence from government. 85 As
discussed above, the Attorney General is accountable to Parliament, or the
appropriate legislature for the decisions he or she makes. 86 And even though the
Attorney General is intended to be independent from other members of the
executive and the Cabinet, such independence may be difficult to exercise in
practice. As the Law Reform Commission of Canada reminds us, the Attorney
General is appointed by the Prime Minister or a Premier, and could be stripped
of his or her Cabinet post for acting against the advice of Cabinet. 87
Although agents of the Attorney General, the security of tenure and financial
security of Crown Attorneys is more similar to any other government employee
than the judiciary, as a prosecutor can be dismissed if he or she fails to live up
to his or her employment obligations.88 However, due to the high level of defer84

Id., at para. 54.
The principles of judicial independence were enunciated in R. v. Valente, [1985] 2 S.C.R.
673, at para. 20.
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In practical terms, the Attorney General’s accountability to the legislature generally arises
only after he or she has already exercised his or her prosecutorial discretion — e.g., in the form of
questions in the House regarding a high-profile case. Therefore, the legislative branch of government cannot be said to have the power to interfere with the decisions made by a prosecutor on a
day-to-day basis.
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In his article “The Role of the Attorney General and the Charter of Rights,” supra, note 8,
Ian Scott recognized that independence from other members of Cabinet in determining prosecution
policy was an important consideration for an Attorney General. For instance, Scott noted that it has
been suggested that an Attorney General would also be required to take legal action against a fellow
minister if he or she were convinced that a course of action was unconstitutional and was otherwise
unable to prevent it. This was also recognized by the LRC, supra, note 11, at 10-11. This may be
one factor the Court considered in Krieger when it noted that “membership in the Cabinet makes
the principle of independence in prosecutorial functions perhaps even more important in this
country than in the U.K..”
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In Ontario, government lawyers are not covered by labour relations statutes. Some protection in this regard is afforded by the requirement that the government employer follow the hiring
practices and grievance processes set out in agreements with government lawyers. Salaries are also
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ence courts afford prosecutorial discretion in both abuse of process and malicious prosecution cases, Crown Attorneys would appear to enjoy more protection from interference by the judicial branch of government. As a result, Crown
Attorneys may make decisions in individual cases free from unwarranted scrutiny from outside sources, or fear of the same (“the Chill Factor” as the trial
judge in Krieger referred to it).89
In contrast, although administrative tribunals are subject to statutory and
common law principles of fairness and natural justice, they are not entitled as a
constitutional principle to the hallmarks of independence. In the recent decision
of Ocean Port Hotel Ltd. v. British Columbia (General Manager Liquor Control Licensing Branch),90 the Supreme Court noted that tribunals are bodies
created by the legislative branch of government, and as such, unless administrative proceedings engage constitutional rights, it is the role of the legislature
to determine relationship between the tribunal and the executive, and the
degree of independence required of a particular tribunal. 91
The Supreme Court jurisprudence concerning judicial independence and the
independence of the Attorney General demonstrate that both concepts have
similar constitutional origins in that both receive some “textual recognition” 92
in the provisions of the Constitution, but their main foundations lie outside the
express sections of the Constitution in the principle of the rule of law, 93 and the
notion that Canada is to have a Constitution “similar in Principle to that of the
United Kingdom.”94 Conversely, administrative tribunals lack any constitutional distinction from the executive and are in fact, instruments for the implementation of government policy.95

IV. THE IMPLICATIONS OF KRIEGER
In Krieger the Supreme Court has clearly enshrined the independence of the
Attorney General in prosecutorial discretion in the Canadian Constitution.

in some instances disputes over salaries can go to binding arbitration. This process, of course, is far
different from the process used to determine judicial salaries.
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Thus, only a very limited range of cases can be properly brought before a
provincial law society, namely where the prosecutor has acted dishonestly or in
bad faith. “Bad faith” in this context goes well beyond negligence and requires
conscious and deliberate wrongdoing. 96 Given the recentness of the decision, it
is too early to tell if provincial law societies will experience an increase in the
number of complaints and discipline proceedings involving Crown Attorneys.
It is hoped that such proceedings will not be used as a vehicle to chill the
independent exercise of prosecutorial discretion and further, that law societies
act in a manner that dissuades improper claims. It is also open to law societies
to work with Attorneys General and other interested parties to create a protocol
which would ensure that only appropriate cases are brought before professional
discipline committees.
Krieger effectively upholds the Nelles and Power standards of “improper
purpose” or “flagrant impropriety” and applies them to professional discipline
proceedings. Since Nelles was released in 1989, there have only been two cases
in Canada (Proulx and Dix v. Canada (Attorney General))97 in which the
plaintiffs in malicious prosecution actions have been successful. 98 Although it
appears that the number of malicious prosecution cases instituted is on the rise,
in Ontario such actions very rarely go to trial. Typically, they are withdrawn,
abandoned or dismissed on a summary judgment motion. Given the seriousness
of the allegations raised in malicious prosecution actions, both for the
individual and the general office of the Crown Attorney, the Ontario Ministry
of the Attorney General takes these cases seriously. The approach taken is
intended to dissuade frivolous litigants and ensure that Crown counsel can
pursue prosecutions without fear of retribution by accused persons or their
counsel.
As with malicious prosecution actions, it is hoped that the nature of Law
Society authority will allow Crown Attorneys to carry on with their duties
without fear of illegitimate claims, while still protecting the interests of
individuals who come into contact with the criminal justice system. As noted
by the trial judge in Krieger:
[w]hen the steps that are required to deal a complaint to the Law Society are
considered it must be said that the hurdles to be jumped and the hoops to be dived
96
This proposition relies on a traditional interpretation of “bad faith,” such as the one in
Black’s Law Dictionary, 6th ed., “not simply bad judgment or negligence but rather it implies the
conscious doing of a wrong because of dishonest purpose or moral obliquity.” To give true effect to
the meaning and spirit of Krieger, it may be prudent for law societies to include a definition of “bad
faith” in their codes of professional ethics.
97
2002 ABQB 580.
98
A lack of success that Kent Roach, a strong critic of the scope of prosecutorial discretion,
calls “the failed promise of malicious prosecution suits.” Roach, supra, note 68, at 12.
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through are at least as onerous as those a plaintiff in a malicious prosecution
faces.99

At the end of the day, Krieger’s most important legacy will be its recognition
of the independence of the Attorney General in prosecutorial decision-making
as a principle of Canadian constitutional law. It will also be viewed as a continuation of the Supreme Court’s deference to decisions made by prosecutors. The
Supreme Court’s persistent application of a deferential standard as evidenced in
the malicious prosecution cases continues to be applied in disciplinary cases.
For Crown Attorneys, this means they will be able to carry out their responsibilities effectively without interference from those less qualified to make prosecutorial decisions.

99

Krieger, 2002 SCC 65, at 51.
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